AREC

Robert Innes

Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1986; Professor; Agricultural Policy Analysis, Microeconomic Theory, Economics of Information and Risk, Environmental Economics.

 

 

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Office: Economics, Rm. 330
Phone: (520) 621-9741
email: innes@ag.arizona.edu

[Robert Innes]
Dr. Innes' research has focused on a variety of issues in microeconomic theory, industrial organization, finance, agricultural policy, environmental economics, and law. He has received the Outstanding Ph.D. Dissertation (1987), Quality of Research Discovery (1994, 1999), and Distinguished Policy Contribution awards from the Agricultural Agricultural Economics Association, the Best Published Research Award (1999) from the Western Agricultural Economics Association, and the Hicks-Tinbergen Medal for outstanding research from the European Economic Association (1994). In 1994-95, Innes served on the Senior staff of the President's Council of Economic Advisers with responsibility for agricultural, natural resource, and international trade issues.

Selected Publications

Innes, Robert, and Stephen Hamilton. “Naked Slotting Fees for Vertical Control of Multi-product Retail Markets.” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(March 2006):303–318.

Innes, Robert. “Fines, Appeals and Liability in Public Enforcement with Stochastic Damage and Asymmetric Information.” Economica, 71( Aug. 2004):391–416.

Innes, Robert. “Enforcement Costs, Optimal Sanctions, and the Choice between Ex-Post Liability and Ex-Ante Regulation.” International Review of Law and Economics, 24(March 2004):29–48.

Innes, Robert. “The Economics of Livestock Waste and Its Regulation.” The Economics of Agri-environmental Policy, 1(2004):339–359.

Innes, Robert. “Crop Insurance in a Political Economy: An Alternative Perspective on Agricultural Policy.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85(May 2003):318–335.

Innes, Robert, and Joseph Bial. “Inducing Innovation in the Environmental Technology of Oligopolistic Firms.” Journal of Industrial Economics 50(Sept 2002):263–285.

Innes, Robert. “Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement.” The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 17(2001):239-256.

Innes, Robert and Dennis Cory. “The Economics of Safe Drinking Water.” Land Economics 77(Feb. 2001):94-117.

Innes, Robert. "Self-Policing and Optimal Law Enforcement When Violator Remediation is Valuable." Journal of Political Economy 107(Dec.1999):1305-1325.

Innes, Robert. "Remediation and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement." Journal of Public Economics 72(June 1999):72-393.

Innes, Robert. "Takings, Compensation and Equal Treatment for Owners of Developed and Undeveloped Property." Journal of Law and Economics 40(October 1997):403-432.

Innes, Robert and Richard Sexton. "Strategic Buyers and Exclusionary Contracts." American Economic Review 84(June 1994):566-584.

Innes, Robert. "Two Season Subsistence Farming, Urban Food Subsidies and Optimal Agricultural Policy." Oxford Economic Papers 45(October 1993):668-690.

Innes, Robert. "Debt, Futures and Options: Optimal Price-Linked Financial Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Limited Liability." International Economic Review 34(May 1993):271-295.

Innes, Robert. "Investment and Government Intervention in Credit Markets When There Is Asymmetric Information." Journal of Public Economics 46(December 1991).

Innes, Robert. "Government Target Price Intervention in Economies with Incomplete Markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics 105(November 1990):1035-1052.

Innes, Robert. "Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting With Ex-Ante Action Choices." Journal of Economic Theory 52(Oct 1990):45-68.

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Last updated June 23, 2006
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